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EXHUMING THE FUNERAL HOME CASES: 
PROPOSING A PRIVATE NUISANCE ACTION BASED 
ON THE MENTAL ANGUISH CAUSED BY POLLUTION 
Michael D. Riseberg* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you have lived in the same house for twenty years, 
and that you have recently decided to sell your property. While check-
ing on your home's listing in the local newspaper, you learn that there 
has been a major accident at a neighboring chemical company. As a 
result of this accident, hazardous waste has contaminated the major-
ity of the ground water in your neighborhood. 
Concerned about the safety of your family, you arrange to have a 
group of experts come to your home and assess the damage to your 
property. Luckily, the experts assure you that because of a geological 
rift in the earth none of the contamination has or ever will physically 
invade your property. 
Relieved, you call your realtor to relay this information. Although 
happy to hear the news, the realtor explains to you that your home 
has nonetheless depreciated by anywhere from fifteen to thirty per-
cent of its original value. Slightly confused and very distressed, you 
ask the realtor why your home should have depreciated when none 
of the contamination has or will invade your property. 
Unfortunately, you discover that the issue is not as simple as 
whether or not any of the pollution has physically invaded your prop-
erty. As a result of the accident, your home has become a less desir-
able place to live. Located in what was once a very appealing residen-
tial neighborhood, your property is now situated amidst area-wide 
contamination. Like good schools or public transportation, you dis-
* Topics Editor, 1993--1994, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
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cover that environmental concerns have a real effect on the value of 
your home. 
To make matters worse, you soon realize that the change in your 
neighborhood is not the only culprit at work. Because of your home's 
location, the majority of consumers mistakenly assume that the con-
tamination has or will physically invade your property. The unfounded 
public perception that your property has been polluted contributes 
significantly to the depreciation of its value. Confident that you can 
remedy this problem, you set out to explain the facts of the situation 
to potential purchasers. Nevertheless, you soon realize that no one is 
willing to pay more for your home than its now greatly diminished 
market value. 
Recently, circumstances virtually identical to these came before the 
Michigan Supreme Court in Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co. I The plain-
tiffs in Adkins were homeowners who brought suit against a chemical 
company for polluting the ground water in their neighborhood with 
toxic chemicals.2 Despite the fact that none of the contamination had 
or would physically invade the plaintiffs' land, the plaintiffs alleged 
that the defendants caused their property values to depreciate be-
cause of the unfounded public perception that their land was polluted.3 
The plaintiffs in Adkins sought relief under a private nuisance 
theory because that theory does not require any physical invasion of 
the plaintiffs' land.4 Essentially, a private nuisance is a substantial 
"interference with the use and enjoyment of land."5 The plaintiffs in 
Adkins alleged that the defendant chemical company, by mishandling 
toxic chemicals, created a private nuisance by causing a stigma of 
contamination to attach to their land.6 
The Michigan Supreme Court, however, refused to recognize the 
plaintiffs' claim.7 The court held that a private nuisance cannot be 
based on the unfounded fears of third party purchasers.s In reaching 
its decision, the Adkins court noted that its determination did not rest 
on the fact that there had not been any physical invasion of the 
plaintiffs' land.9 The Adkins decision reaffirmed the widely held belief 
1487 N.W.2d 715, 717-19 (Mich. 1992). 
2Id. at 717. 
3Id. at 719--21. 
4 See id. at 721-22. 
5W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS § 87, at 619 (5th 
ed.1984). 
6 See Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Mich. 1992). 
7Id. 
BId. 
9 See id. at 721. 
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that property depreciation, without other harm, is damnum absque 
injuria-Le., a loss without injury in the legal sense.lO 
This Comment focuses on exactly what a plaintiff must allege, in 
addition to a depreciation in property value, to establish a cognizable 
claim in private nuisance where there has not been any physical 
invasion of the plaintiff's land. Section II provides a general overview 
of the private nuisance doctrine, focusing on the interest protected by 
the nuisance doctrine and the general rule that property depreciation 
without other harm is damnum absque injuriaY Section III discusses 
whether or not a physical invasion of the plaintiff's land has tradition-
ally been considered a tacit requirement of a nuisance actionP Section 
IV examines cases involving nuisance claims based solely on a land-
owner's mental anguish without any physical invasion of the plaintiff's 
land.13 This section also surveys the recent trend in the courts away 
from recognizing such claims.14 Section V takes a closer look at the 
Adkins decision revealing that a possibility of recovery may remain 
for a plaintiff who finds himself or herself in a similar situation.15 
Finally, section VI proposes that a plaintiff in this situation might 
prevail by setting forth a private nuisance action based on the mental 
anguish of living amidst area-wide contamination.16 
II. THE PRIVATE NUISANCE DOCTRINE 
A. The Analytical Framework and Elements of the Private 
Nuisance Action 
A private nuisancel7 is a "nontrespassory invasion of another's in-
terest in the private use and enjoyment of land."18 While a trespass 
10 [d. See also Ann Vander Laan v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 1:89-CV-867, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13041, at *26 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 1993); Gunther v. E.!. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 157 F. 
Supp. 25, 33 (N.D. W. Va. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 255 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1958); City of 
Newport v. Emery, 559 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Ark. 1977); Bader v. Iowa Metro. Sewer Co., 178 N.W.2d 
305, 307-08 (Iowa 1970); Martin v. Williams, 93 S.E.2d 835, 843-44 (W. Va. 1956). 
11 See infra notes 17-97 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 98-169 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 170-99 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 200-16 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 230-45 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 246...{l2 and accompanying text. 
17 This Comment focuses on the private nuisance action as opposed to public nuisance. For a 
discussion of the differences between a private nuisance and public nuisance action, see KEETON 
ET AL., supra note 5, § 86, at 618. Unless otherwise indicated, the use of the word nuisance in 
this Comment refers to the private nuisance action only. 
18 Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1002 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 821D (1977». 
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protects the right to the exclusive possession of land, a private nui-
sance protects those rights that are incidental to property owner-
ship.19 For example, while a trespass action prevents the defendant 
from walking across the plaintiff's land or casting objects upon it,20 a 
private nuisance action prevents the defendant from projecting odors 
or noises onto the plaintiff's land that disturb the comfortable use and 
enjoyment of it.21 
Ultimately, the line that separates a trespass action from a private 
nuisance action is a fuzzy one.22 An important distinction, however, is 
that a trespass action can arise without regard to any harm or damage 
being caused to the plaintiffs land.23 This is because a trespass action 
is designed to provide a peaceful way of vindicating property rights 
and resolving disputes regarding title to land.24 A private nuisance, 
on the other hand, requires that the disturbance complained of cause 
substantial harm to the plaintiff.25 The courts have held that an inter-
ference is substantial where it would cause significant harm to a 
person of normal sensibilities in the community.26 
The substantial interference requirement reflects the conflict be-
tween neighboring land uses that lies at the heart of the nuisance 
doctrine.?:7 While landowners each have the right to use their property 
as they see fit, this right must be balanced against the correlative 
19 See, e.g., Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1540 (D. Kan. 1990). See 
generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 87, at 622. 
20 KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 13, at 70. 
21 See, e.g., Maddy, 737 F. Supp. at 1540; Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 
832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
22 See, e.g., Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 833-34 n.6. The Restatement (Second) of Torts com-
ments: 
There may ... be some overlapping of the causes of action for trespass and private 
nuisance .... If the interference with the use and enjoyment of land is a significant 
one, sufficient in itself to amount to a private nuisance, the fact that it arises out of or 
is accompanied by a trespass will not prevent recovery for the nuisance .... The two 
actions, trespass and private nuisance, are thus not entirely exclusive or inconsistent, 
and in a proper case in which the elements of both actions are fully present, the plaintiff 
may have his choic~ of one or the other, or may proceed upon both. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. e (1977). 
23 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 13, at 70. 
24Id. § 13, at 70. 
25 See, e.g., Robie v. Lillis, 299 A.2d 155, 158 (N.H. 1972) ("[s]ubstantial harm is that in excess 
of the customary interferences a land user suffers in an organized society. It denotes an 
appreciable and tangible interference with a property interest."). 
26 See, e.g., Gunther v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 157 F. Supp. 25, 32 (N.D. W. Va. 1957), 
afi'd on other grounds, 255 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1958); Dorsett v. Nunis, 13 S.E.2d 371, 373 (Ga. 
1941); Smith v. Western Wayne County Conservation Ass'n, 158 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Mich. 1968). 
27 See, e.g., Ann Vander Laan v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 1:89-CV-867, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13041, at *24-25 (WD. Mich. Aug. 18, 1993); Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 719 
(Mich. 1992). 
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right of each landowner to be free from an unreasonable interference 
created by another.28 Nonetheless, the courts recognize that it is not 
a nuisance every time one landowner disturbs another.29 The courts 
recognize that certain disturbances must be tolerated because they 
are incidental to living in an organized society.30 
In addition to the substantial interference requirement, a nuisance 
must also satisfy one of two other standards to be actionable.31 Ac-
cording to § 822 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the interfer-
ence must also be either "(a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) 
unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling 
liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally danger-
ous conditions or activities."32 Accordingly, there are two general 
categories of nuisance actions, one intentional and the other uninten-
tional. 
1. An Intentional and Unreasonable Nuisance Claim 
By intentional conduct the courts do not mean that the defendant 
acts with malice.33 Rather, a nuisance results from intentional conduct 
"merely in the sense that the defendant has created or continued the 
condition causing the interference with full knowledge that the harm 
to the plaintiff's interest is occurring or is substantially certain to 
follow."34 A nuisance is unreasonable if it "would not be reasonable to 
permit the defendant to cause such an amount of harm intentionally 
without compensating for it."35 At the heart of the unreasonable use 
requirement is the balancing test-"of the harm created versus the 
utility of the conduct creating the harm."36 In making this determina-
tion, the courts consider the character of the locality, the extent and 
nature of the harm involved, and the utility of the conduct creating 
the harm.37 
28 See, e.g., Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 130 S.E.2d 363, 367 (S.C. 1963). 
29 E.g., id. 
30 E.g., id. 
3! See Beth I. French, Note, A Private Nuisance Approach 7b Hazardous Waste Disposal 
Sites, 7 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 86, 102 (1980). 
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 822 (1977). 
33 See French, supra note 31, at 102 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 825 cmt. c, 
d (1977». 
34 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 87, at 625. See also Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co., 122 
N.E.2d 48, 51-52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954). 
35 KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 88, at 626. 
36 See French, supra note 31, at 102"'{)3. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 
(1977); Patterson, 122 N.E.2d at 51-52. 
37 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 88, at 630; Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 130 S.E.2d 
363,367 (S.C. 1963); Patterson, 122 N.E.2d at 51-52. 
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2. An Unintentional and Negligent Nuisance Claim 
In addition to intentional and unreasonable nuisance claims, the 
courts also recognize nuisance claims arising from unintentional con-
duct.38 In order for unintentional conduct to be actionable as a nui-
sance, the plaintiff must show that the conduct was negligent, reck-
less, or abnormally dangerous.39 Courts recognize nuisance claims 
based on unintentional or accidental conduct despite the general rule 
that the maintenance of a nuisance implies a continuity of action over 
a period oftime.40 The courts recognize that in certain circumstances, 
a single act, such as the contamination of ground water, can produce 
a continuing result that is sufficient to create a nuisance without 
requiring a recurrence of the act.41 
In summary, a private nuisance action protects a property right 
or privilege respecting the use and enjoyment of land.42 A nuisance 
action will not arise unless the interference is substantial in that it 
would cause significant harm to a person of normal sensibilities.43 
Additionally, to be actionable a nuisance must be (1) intentional and 
unreasonable; or (2) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the 
rules governing liability for negligent, reckless, or ultra-hazardous 
conduct.44 Because Adkins involved the unintentional or accidental 
release of toxic chemicals, it falls within the latter variety of nuisance 
claims. 
B. The Interest Protected 
The initial requirement of a nuisance action is an interference with 
a property right or interest respecting the plaintiff's use and enjoy-
ment of land.45 The nuisance doctrine, however, covers so many types 
of injury that "it is difficult to articulate an encompassing definition" 
of the interest it protects.46 Often a nuisance will take the form of some 
38 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 822 (1977). 
39 See id. 
40 See, e.g., Gray v. Southern Facilities, Inc., 183 S.E.2d 438, 442-43 (S.C. 1971). 
41 [d. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 832 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 
5, § 87, at 624. 
42 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. 
43 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
44 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
46 See Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Mich. 1992) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF ToRTS §§ 821D-F, 822 (1977». A nuisance is said to describe a type of harm rather 
than a cause of tort liability. See, e.g., Frank v. Envtl. Sanitation Management Inc., 687 S.W.2d 
876, 889 (Mo. 1985). 
46 E.g., Ann Vander Laan v. Marathon Oil Co., No. 1:89-CV-867, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13041, 
at *24 (w'D. Mich. Aug. 18, 1993). 
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actual physical damage either to the plaintiffs land or to tangible 
property located on the landY For example, in Mel Foster Co. Prop-
erties v. The American Oil Co. (AMOCO),48 it was a nuisance where 
gasoline seeped onto the plaintiff's property causing the property to 
become less attractive for the development of commercial real es-
tate.49 Similarly, in Lacy Feed Co. v. Parrish,50 it was a nuisance where 
large amounts of feathers and dust got into the plaintiffs water 
storage tank thereby polluting what had previously been good drink-
ing water.51 
Alternatively, a nuisance can take the form of a physical discomfort 
to those who are using or occupying the land.52 According to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the "freedom from discomfort and 
annoyance while using land is often as important to a person as 
freedom from physical interruption with his use or freedom from 
detrimental change in the physical condition of the land itself."53 For 
example, it was a nuisance in Pate v. City of Martin,54 where odors 
emanating from the operation of a nearby sewage lagoon made habi-
tation of the plaintiffs' homes almost impossible.55 Similarly, in Jones 
v. Queen City Speedways, Inc.,56 it was a nuisance where lights used 
to illuminate an automobile race track cast a glare on the plaintiffs' 
property which kept the plaintiffs awake at night.57 Finally, in 
Guarina v. Bogart,58 a drive-in movie theater, equipped with loud-
speakers, constituted a private nuisance with respect to neighboring 
property owners who were disturbed by the noise.59 
In addition to physical discomfort, the courts have also recognized 
that the nuisance doctrine protects a landowner from mental distur-
47 KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 87, at 619. 
48 427 N.W.2d 171 (Iowa 1988). 
49Id. at 172-73. 
50 517 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). 
51Id. at 849. 
52 KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 87, at 619-20. 
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. b (1977). 
54 614 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn. 1981). 
55 See id. at 47. See also Park Ctr., Inc. v. Champion Int'l Corp., 804 F. Supp. 294, 302-03 (S.D. 
Ala. 1992) (under Alabama law, defendant's use of lupuna wood in plaintiff's building, by creating 
noxious odor, constituted a cognizable claim in private nuisance). 
56 172 S.E.2d 42 (N.C. 1970). 
57Id. at 43. See also Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51, 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931) (cars pulling 
into gas station which cast bright lights into plaintiff's house created actionable nuisance). 
58 180 A.2d 557 (Pa. 1962). 
59 See id. at 559-60. See also Anne Arundel County Fish & Game Conservation Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Carlucci, 573 A.2d 847, 848-49, 853 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (loud noise emanating from 
defendant's property which frightened plaintiffs child constituted a private nuisance). 
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bances.6o For example, in Powell v. Taylor,6! the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas enjoined the establishment of a funeral home "not upon a 
finding that [the] undertaking parlor [was] physically offensive but 
rather upon the premise that its continuous suggestion of death and 
dead bodies tend[ed] to destroy the comfort and repose sought in 
home ownership."62 
Despite the various forms that a nuisance action can take, commen-
tators have criticized the Restatement (Second) of Torts for its effort 
to label all conduct that interferes with the use and enjoyment of land 
as a nuisance.63 They argue that despite being gathered under a single 
label, "the so-called interest in the use and enjoyment of property is 
not a single type of interest."64 These different interests "are not 
protected in the same way from all kinds of conduct."65 In other words, 
the protectible property interest in the use and enjoyment of land 
may fluctuate depending on what type of conduct creates the harm. 
Essentially, what might be a nuisance arising out of one type of 
conduct, might not be a nuisance arising out of a different type of 
conduct.66 For example, where the interference takes the form of a 
mental disturbance, an actionable claim arises only if the mental dis-
turbance results from intentional conduct.67 Where a mental distur-
bance results from unintentional or negligent conduct, it will gener-
ally not be actionable as a nuisance unless accompanied by another 
ground of tort liability.68 It is a widely accepted rule in negligence that 
"an action will not lie for fright, shock or mental anguish which is 
unaccompanied by physical contact or injury."69 The reason for this 
rule is that "such damages are too remote and speculative, are easily 
60 KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 87, at 620. 
61 263 S.W.2d 906 (Ark. 1954). 
62 [d. at 907. 
63 KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 87, at 623, § 91, at 652. 
64 [d. § 91, at 652. 
65 [d. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. at 653. See, e.g., Rockenbach v. Apostle, 47 N.W.2d 636, 643 (Mich. 1951) (enjoining 
the establishment of a funeral home because it was a constant reminder of death that had 
a depressing effect on neighboring landowners and reduced neighboring property values); 
Tedescki v. Berger, 43 So. 960, 961 (Ala. 1907) (prohibiting continued operation of a house of 
prostitution because it rendered neighboring plaintiff's home "not only less comfortable, but 
intolerable, and it necessarily depreciated the value of his property"). 
68 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 91, at 653. The assertion that a nuisance cannot be 
based solely on a mental disturbance where the nuisance arises out of negligent conduct should 
not be confused with nuisance cases in which mental anguish is recoverable as an element of 
damages. See, e.g., Macca v. General Telephone Co. of Northwest, Inc., 495 P.2d 1193, 1195-96 
(Or. 1972). See also infra notes 217-29 and accompanying text. 
69 Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 145-46 (Ky. 1980). 
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simulated and difficult to disprove, and there is no standard by which 
they can be justly measured."70 
1. An Exception to the Physical Impact Rule in Negligence: The 
Bystander Proximity Doctrine 
Despite the need to avoid fraudulent claims, some courts have 
recognized an exception to the physical impact rule in negligence. The 
California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg71 created the so-called 
"bystander proximity doctrine"72 which holds a defendant liable for a 
plaintiff's emotional trauma despite the absence of any physical im-
pact to the plaintiff.73 This doctrine requires that the plaintiff's emo-
tional trauma be reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the time 
of the accident.74 This exception was used in Dillon to compensate a 
mother for the emotional trauma she suffered from witnessing her 
child get run down and killed by a motorist although the mother was 
in a position of complete safety.75 
In reaching its decision, the California Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that it must "deny recovery upon a legitimate claim because 
other fraudulent ones may be [set forth]."76 The court reasoned that 
although juries and trial courts sometimes reach erroneous results, 
that does not justify substituting the case-by-case resolution of dis-
putes with an "artificial and indefensible barrier."77 According to the 
court, "the mere assertion that fraud is possible" does not require 
courts to abandon principles of "foreseeability, proximate cause and 
consequential injury that generally govern tort law."78 
Recognizing a need to limit the defendant's liability, the Dillon 
court held that the defendant should be liable only for injuries to 
others which were reasonably foreseeable at the time of the accident.79 
To determine whether the injury should have been foreseen by the 
defendant, the court took into account the following factors: 
7°Id. 
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident 
as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) 
71 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). 
72 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 54, at 366. 
73 See Dillou, 441 P.2d at 914-15. 
74Id. at 919. 
75Id. at 914, 921. 
76Id. at 917-18. 
77Id. at 918. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 919. 
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Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon 
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the 
accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others 
after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were 
closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship 
or the presence of only a distant relationship.80 
In holding that the plaintiff had set forth a sufficient prima facie case, 
the Dillon court concluded that the negligent driver who caused the 
death of the young child should reasonably have foreseen that the 
mother would not be a far distance away and would, upon witnessing 
the accident, suffer emotional trauma.81 
C. In Private Nuisance, Property Depreciation, Without Other 
Harm, is Damnum Absque Injuria 
Despite certain controversies regarding the scope of the nuisance 
doctrine,82 the courts have long recognized that a depreciation in 
property value, without other harm, does not constitute an actionable 
interference with the use and enjoyment of property.83 Property de-
preciation, in itself, is considered damnum absque injuria, because it 
does not belong to that class of wrongs arising from the "unreason-
able, unwarranted or unlawful use of one's property."84 
This rule protects a landowner in the freedom to use his or her 
property as he or she sees fit.85 For example, the construction of a 
jailhouse or a gas station in a residential neighborhood will not con-
stitute a nuisance merely because it causes a depreciation in property 
80Id. at 920. 
81Id. at 921. 
82 See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text. 
83 Dorsett v. NlIDis, 13 S.E.2d 371, 373 (Ga. 1941) (lawful operation of a church bell did not 
constitute nuisance despite depreciation in neighboring property values); Bader v. Iowa Metro. 
Sewer Co., 178 N.W.2d 305, 307-08 (Iowa 1970) (property depreciation caused by the lawful 
operation of sewage treatment lagoon did not constitute nuisance); Winget v. Wmn-Dixie Stores, 
Inc., 130 S.E.2d 363, 369 (S.C. 1963) (lawful operation of supermarket could not constitute 
nuisance based upon property depreciation). 
84 See, e.g., GlIDther v. E.!. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 157 F. Supp. 25, 33 (N.D. W. Va. 1957), 
aff'd on other grounds, 255 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1958). 
86 See Stotler v. Rochelle, 109 P. 788, 789 (Kan. 1910). The Stotler court noted: 
Id. 
[T]he law does not recognize any legal right in anyone to compel his neighbor to follow 
his tastes, wishes, or preferences, or to consult his mere convenience. He cannot dictate 
the style of architecture or, generally, the location of the buildings; or maintain that an 
IIDsightly or ill proportioned edifice is a nuisance because if offends his eye, or his too 
cultivated taste .... The diminution of the market value of adjacent buildings, by such 
use, will not of itself make it a nuisance. 
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values.86 Similarly, the mere placement or location of a facility such as 
a nuclear power plant87 or a sanitary landfill88 does not constitute a 
nuisance merely because it causes a reduction in neighboring prop-
erty values. Furthermore, it is not a nuisance where a landowner uses 
a style of architecture or a color of paint on his or her property that 
causes neighboring property values to depreciate.89 According to one 
commentator, where a landowner erects a business on his land that 
detracts customers away from his neighbor's business, his neighbor 
suffers damnum but there might be no injuria.9o 
The failure of courts, however, to distinguish damnum (damages) 
from injuria (injury) has been the source of much confusion with 
respect to the role of property depreciation in the nuisance doctrine.91 
Although property depreciation, in itself, does not constitute an "ac-
tual interference" with the use and enjoyment of land,92 it is never-
theless recoverable as a "traditional element of damages" in the nui-
sance doctrine.93 For example, courts have held that when a nuisance 
results in contamination of property for an indefinite period of time, 
the proper measure of damages is the diminution in the market value 
of the property.94 
Similar to its role as an element of damages, property depreciation 
is also used as a measuring stick for assessing when an independent 
harm, such as a noise or odor, has risen to an actionable level.95 In 
other words, courts will often intercede only where plaintiffs show an 
interference with the use and enjoyment of their property substantial 
enough to reduce market value.96 Thus, courts have said that property 
depreciation is a contributing factor in assessing whether a nuisance 
has been created, but is not a controlling factor.97 
86 City of Newport v. Emery, 559 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Ark. 1977). 
87 See Akins v. Sacramento Mun. Uti!. Dist., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), 
r(fIJiew granted, 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1992). 
88 See City of Newport, 559 S.W.2d at 709. 
89 See Stotler, 109 P. at 789. 
90 William A. McRae, Jr., The D(fIJelopment of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. FLA. 
L. REV. 27, 38 (1948). 
91 See, e.g., Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 723 (Mich. 1992). 
92 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
93 See Adkins, 487 N.W.2d at 725. 
94 See, e.g., Mel Foster Co. Properties v. American Oil Co. (AMOCO), 427 N.W.2d 171, 175 
(Iowa 1988); Pate v. City of Martin, 614 S.w'2d 46, 48-49 (Tenn. 1981). 
95 See Twitty v. State of North Carolina, 354 S.E.2d 296, 304 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987). See also 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 88, at 627. 
96 See Twitty, 354 S.E.2d at 304. 
97 See Jones v. Chapel Hill, 69 N.Y.S.2d 753, 758 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 77 N.Y.S.2d 867 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1948). 
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III. NUISANCE AND THE ISSUE OF PHYSICAL IMPACT 
As previously indicated, property depreciation, in itself, cannot 
create a nuisance because it does not constitute the type of "actual 
interference" with the use and enjoyment of land that a nuisance 
action requires.98 In assessing what does constitute an "actual inter-
ference," controversy arises with respect to whether such an inter-
ference requires a physical invasion of the plaintiff's land. 
A Nuisance Claims Involving a Physical Invasion of the 
Plaintiff's Land 
Traditionally, the nuisance doctrine has been distinguished from 
trespass in that nuisance does not require entry onto the plaintiff's 
land.99 While it is true that a nuisance does not require a tangible 
entry onto the plaintiffs land rising to the level of a trespass,lOO the 
vast majority of nuisance actions do involve a physical invasion of the 
plaintiff's land.101 Indeed, there is considerable overlap between the 
nuisance and trespass doctrines.1oo 
As previously discussed, many nuisance claims involve actual physi-
cal damage either to the plaintiff's land or to tangible property located 
on the plaintiffs land.1°O In such situations, the nuisance doctrine is 
much like the trespass doctrine in that the nuisance generally results 
from a tangible invasion of the plaintiff's property.104 For example, in 
Mel Foster,I05 gasoline seeped onto the plaintiff's property causing it 
to become less attractive for the development of commercial real 
estateYJ6 Similarly, in Lacy,Hfl the defendant's turkey farm created 
a nuisance by causing large amounts of feathers and dust to travel 
onto the plaintiffs property and get into the plaintiff's water storage 
tanks.1OB 
98 See supra notes 83--84 and accompanying text. 
99 See, e.g., Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 722 (Mich. 1992). 
100 See, e.g., Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). See 
also Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1539-40 (D. Kan. 1990). 
101 See infra notes 103-17 and accompanying text. 
1m See, e.g., Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 833 n.6. 
100 See supra notes 47-ii1 and accompanying text. 
104 See, e.g., Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 833 n.6. 
105 Mel Foster, 427 N.W.2d 171 (Iowa 1988). 
1('13 See id. at 172-73. 
1117 Lacy, 517 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). 
100 [d. at 849. 
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Unlike a trespass, a nuisance does not require a tangible invasion 
of the plaintiffs land to be actionable.109 A tangible invasion of land is 
generally necessary to create the type of interference with the exclu-
sive possession of land that the trespass doctrine was designed to 
prevent yo A private nuisance, however, protects the more expansive 
right to the use and enjoyment of land.111 
As previously discussed, many nuisance claims take the form of a 
physical discomfort to the occupants of the plaintiffs land,112 as where 
lights keep the plaintiff awake at night,113 odors make habitation of 
the plaintiffs land impossible,114 or noise frightens the plaintiff's chil-
drenY5 Although such intangible invasions are generally insufficient 
to give rise to a trespass,116 they are arguably physical invasions of 
the plaintiff's property. In such situations, one could argue that the 
noise, odor, or light actually passes over and onto the plaintiff's prop-
erty.117 
The courts, however, recognize that a nuisance is not contingent on 
a physical invasion of the plaintiff's land, but rather is contingent 
on whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably interfered 
with plaintiffs use and enjoyment of propertyYs Accordingly, there 
are a minority of nuisance cases arising without any physical invasion 
of the plaintiffs landY9 The most common example of these are the 
so-called anticipatory nuisance claims in which the threat of future 
injury creates a present interference with the use and enjoyment 
of land.l20 Additionally, a nuisance can arise without any existing or 
threatened physical invasion of land where the defendant causes 
either a physical inconvenience121 or mental disturbance122 to the oc-
cupants of the land. 
109 See, e.g., Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1539--40 (D. Kan. 1990); Exxon 
Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1002 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). 
110 Maddy, 737 F. Supp. at 1539-40. 
111 See id. at 1540. 
112 See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text. 
113 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
114 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
115 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
116 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 13, at 71. 
117 See Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1002 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). 
118Id. 
119 One example of nuisance cases arising without any physical invasion of land are the 
so-called aesthetic nuisance cases. See, e.g., Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791, 794 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1984); Foley v. Harris, 286 S.E.2d 186, 19~91 (Va. 1982); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. 
Barrack, 191 S.E. 368, 371 (W. Va. 1937). See also Raymond R. Coletta, The Case for Aesthetic 
Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional Judicial Attitudes, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 141 (1987). 
120 See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text. 
121 See infra notes 157--B9 and accompanying text. 
122 See infra notes 170-99 and accompanying text. 
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B. Anticipatory Nuisance Cases 
The most common examples of nuisance claims arising without any 
physical invasion of land are the so-called anticipatory nuisance claims 
in which the threat of future injury creates a present interference 
with the use and enjoyment of land. l23 In a number of early anticipa-
tory nuisance cases, courts enjoined certain establishments, such as 
tuberculosis sanitariumsl24 or cancer hospitals,125 from locating in resi-
dential neighborhoods based on neighboring landowners' fears of con-
tagion.126 
In a number of these cases courts indicated a willingness to enjoin 
these establishments despite the fact that the plaintiffs' fears were 
not based on scientifically verifiable or reasonable concerns.127 For 
example, in Everett v. Paschall,128 the Washington Supreme Court 
enjoined the continued operation of a tuberculosis sanitarium based 
on a neighboring landowner's fear of contagion.129 According to the 
court "[t]he question is not whether the fear is founded in science ... 
but whether it is real, in that it affects the movements and conduct 
of men."130 Despite this dictum, the Everett court found that tubercu-
losis did pose some actual threat to neighboring landowners.13l Thus, 
the court explained that its decision did not rest on fears that were 
"unreal, imaginary, or fanciful."l32 
Nonetheless, the Everett court's explanation stands for the propo-
sition that a nuisance can be based on unfounded fears so long as an 
average person in the community would be similarly frightened. 133 
The reasoning in cases like Everett, however, is probably best viewed 
123 KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 87, at 620. See also Charles J. Doane, Note, Beyond Fear: 
Articulating A Modern Doctrine in Anticipatory Nuisance For Enjoining Improbable Threats 
of Catastrophic Harm, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 441 (1990). 
124 See Everett v. Paschall, 111 P. 879, 879, 882 (Wash. 1910). 
125 See Stotler v. Rochelle, 109 P. 788, 788, 790 (Kan. 1910). 
126 See, e.g., City of Baltimore v. Fairfield Improvement Co., 39 A. 1081, 1084 (Md. 1898); 
Birchard v. Board of Health of Lansing, 169 N.W. 901, 901 (Mich. 1918); Barth v. Christian 
Psychopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 163 N.W. 62, 64 (Mich. 1917). 
127 See, e.g., Stotler, 109 P. at 790; Fairfield Improvement, 39 A. at 1084; Birchard, 169 N.W. 
at 90l. 
123 111 P. 879 (Wash. 1910). 
129 Id. at 879, 882. 
130 I d. at 880. 
131 Id. at 88l. 
132 Id. at 880. 
133 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 88, 629. See also Todd D. Brown, Note, The Power 
Line Plaintiff & The Inverse Condemnation Alternative, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 655, 677 
(1992). 
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as the high-water mark with respect to the anticipatory nuisance 
cases.l34 
The trend in subsequent decisions has been to require that an 
anticipatory nuisance be based on a real and reasonable concern of 
future harm.135 In O'Laughlin v. City of Fort Gibson,136 for example, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to overturn a decision denying 
plaintiffs' request to enjoin the construction of a sewage facility in 
their neighborhood.137 The plaintiffs based their claim on allegations 
that the lagoon would emit noxious odors, and might overflow causing 
pollution to disseminate onto their property.138 Ruling against the 
plaintiffs, the O'Laughlin court decided that it would not apply the 
reasoning in Everett with respect to recognizing nuisance claims 
based on unfounded fears. 139 Accordingly, the O'Laughlin court re-
fused to issue the injunction because the evidence failed to demon-
strate a reasonable probability that injury would result.l40 
The anticipatory nuisance theory was used in two recent class 
action cases.141 In DeSario v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc.,t42 for 
example, the Ohio Court of Appeals commented that "in Ohio, to 
recover damages under a private nuisance theory, the plaintiffs need 
not show a physical intrusion onto their land."143 The plaintiffs were a 
group of homeowners who filed a class action in nuisance against, 
among others, the owners of an industrial waste landfill.l44 The court 
affirmed the plaintiffs' class certification that was based on members 
asserting a claim for a reduction in property values caused by the 
presence of the landfill.145 In addition to plaintiffs whose land was 
physically contaminated by the waste, the group also included land-
owners whose property was merely threatened with exposure in the 
future. l46 As to these landowners, the court commented that "a class 
134 See Doane, supra note 123, at 458-59 n.128. 
135 [d. Despite this trend, there are a number of inverse condemnation cases in which land-
owners have been permitted to recover damages for property depreciation caused by unfounded 
fears that resulted from a taking. See, e.g., City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 845 P.2d 753, 756-57 (N .M. 
1992); San Diego Gas & Elec., Co. v. Daley, 253 Cal. Rptr. 144, 151-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
136 389 P.2d 506 (Okla. 1964). 
137 [d. at 508-10. 
138 [d. at 507-08. 
139 [d. 509-10. 
140 [d. 
141 See DeSario v. Industrial Excess Landfill, 587 N.E.2d 454, 461...{j2 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1991); 
Allen v. Uni-First Corp., 558 A.2d 961, 963...{j4 (Vt. 1988). 
142 587 N.E.2d at 454. 
143 [d. at 461. 
144 [d. at 455. 
145 [d. at 458. 
146 See id. at 461-62. 
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action may be premised on the public's perception of contamination 
irrespective of actual land contamination."147 Despite this language, 
DeSario simply reaffirms the belief that a nuisance can arise without 
actual contamination of the plaintiff's land, so long as there is, at least, 
a threat of contamination in the future. 
Similarly, in Allen v. Uni-First Corp.,148 the Vermont Supreme 
Court held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on 
damages based on evidence of the public perception of widespread 
contamination.149 The case involved a private nuisance action brought 
by homeowners against a dry cleaning operator. The plaintiffs alleged 
that the defendant discharged hazardous chemical residuals from its 
business operation into the town's sewage system which ultimately 
leaked into the ground.l50 In reaching its decision, the Vermont Su-
preme Court noted that in addition to evidence of actual contamina-
tion at the public schools and town well, the jury heard evidence that 
the bedrock and the deep acquifers beneath the town had become 
contaminated.151 Additionally, expert testimony was adduced to the 
effect that underground plumes of contamination were migrating 
slowly through the bedrock under the town.l52 The court also found 
that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to establish a causal 
connection between the overall contamination theory and the alleged 
decrease in plaintiffs' property values.l53 Thus, the court concluded 
that the jury was permitted to consider the "public perception" of 
contamination in assessing whether a permanent nuisance had been 
created.l54 In summary, Allen is a case in which there was sufficient 
evidence of actual and threatened contamination throughout the town 
such that the jury was permitted to consider the extent of the pollu-
tion problem caused by the "public perception" of widespread con-
tamination. 
In conclusion, Allen and DeSario appear to reaffirm the belief that 
a private nuisance action does not require an actual physical invasion 
of the plaintiff's land. In each of these cases, however, there was, at 
least, a threat of future contamination.l55 Accordingly, the reasoning 
147 [d. at 461. 
148 558 A.2d 961 (Vt. 1988). 
149 [d. at 963-65. 
150 [d. at 962-63. 
151 [d. at 963. 
152 [d. at 963-64. 
153 [d. at 964. 
154 [d. at 963, 965. 
155 DeSario v. Industrial Excess Landfill, 587 N.E.2d 454, 461-62 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1991); Allen 
v. Uni-First Corp., 558 A.2d 961, 963-64 (Vt. 1988). 
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in these cases would not appear to provide relief for plaintiffs in an 
Adkins situation whose land is not, and never will be, contaminated.l56 
C. Nuisance Claims Without Physical Invasion Based on a 
Physical Inconvenience to Occupants 
Unlike the anticipatory nuisance cases in which there was a threat 
of future invasion ofland, the court in Exxon Corp. v. Yaremal57 found 
a nuisance without any existing physical invasion of land or threat of 
future invasion.l58 In Yarema, landowners brought an action against 
the owner of a service station to recover for a private nuisance result-
ing from leakage of gasoline from storage tanks.159 The evidence 
showed that contamination had spread to several building lots.16o The 
property of one of the plaintiffs, however, had not been contaminated 
because it was up gradient and a substantial distance from the service 
station.161 Even though this land had not been contaminated, the city's 
health department imposed severe land use restrictions upon itYl2 
These restrictions forbade the plaintiffs from using their ground 
water, building houses on their land, or selling their property even at 
a reduced price.163 
Appealing a lower court decision that found in favor of the plain-
tiffs, the defendant argued that there could be no recovery in nuisance 
for those plaintiffs whose property had not actually been contami-
nated.l64 In affirming the lower court decision, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals held that "although a nuisance may involve a physical impact 
much of the time, that is not an essential element of the tort."I65 The 
appeals court reasoned that the gasoline contamination imposed se-
vere restrictions both on the contaminated land and the property 
adjacent to it.l66 The court decided that these were injuries for which 
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover if the jury believed that the 
harm was caused by the defendant's tortious conduct.167 
156 See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text. 
157 516 A.2d 990 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). 
158 See id. at 1001'''{)5. 
159Id. at 994-95. 
16°Id. at 994. 
161 I d. at 100l. 
162Id. at 994-95. 
163Id. 
164 I d. at 1001'''{)2. 
165 I d. at 1004. 
166 See id. at 1005. 
167Id. 
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To summarize, Yarenw goes beyond the anticipatory nuisance cases 
in that a nuisance is found without any existing or threatened physical 
invasion of land.168 The plaintiffs in Yarenw sustained a severe physi-
cal inconvenience to the use and enjoyment of their property. They 
were prohibited from using their drinking water, selling their prop-
erty, or even building on it.169 Even more controversial than Yarenw, 
however, is whether a nuisance claim may be based solely a land-
owner's mental anguish without any existing or threatened physical 
invasion of the land. 
IV. PRIVATE NUISANCE CLAIMS BASED SOLELY ON MENTAL 
ANGUISH 
Although a private nuisance does not require an existing or threat-
ened physical invasion ofland,170 the question whether a nuisance may 
be based solely on a mental disturbance to the occupants of the land, 
has been the source of controversy.l7l In the early half of the twentieth 
century, courts embraced the idea that a private nuisance protects a 
landowner from mental disturbance as well as physical discomfort.172 
In these early cases, nuisance claims were based on the mental dis-
turbance of living next to certain establishments, such as funeral 
homes or prostitution houses, without any existing or threatened 
physical invasion of land.173 Although these cases have never been 
overruled, modern courts have been reluctant to recognize nuisance 
claims based solely on mental anguish.174 
A. The Funeral Home and Prostitution House Cases 
In the early half of the twentieth century, the courts frequently 
used the nuisance doctrine to enjoin certain establishments such as 
funeral homes175 and prostitution houses176 from operating in residen-
168 See supra notes 158--61 and accompanying text. 
169 Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1005 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). 
170 See supra notes 158--69 and accompanying text. 
171 See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 87, at 623-24. 
172 See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. 
173 See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text. 
174 See infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text. 
175 See, e.g., Howard v. Etchieson, 310 S.W.2d 473, 474-75 (Ark. 1958); Powell v. Taylor, 263 
S.W.2d 906, 907 (Ark. 1954); Rockenbach v. Apostle, 47 N.W.2d 636, 643 (Mich. 1951); Dillon v. 
Moran, 211 N.W. 67, 67-ti8 (Mich. 1926); Saier v. Joy, 164 N.W. 507, 509 (Mich. 1917); Williams v. 
Montgomery, 186 S. 302,305 (Miss. 1939); Streett v. Marshall, 291 S.W. 494, 494, 499 (Mo. 1927); 
Threman v. Ketterlin, 263 S.W. 202, 204-05 (Mo. 1924); Bragg v. rYeS, 140 S.E. 656, 660-61 (Va. 
Ct. App. 1927). 
176 See Tedescki v. Berger, 43 So. 960, 961-ti2 (Ala. 1907); Crawford v. Tyrrell, 28 N.E. 514, 515 
(N.Y. 1891). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 87, at 620. 
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tial neighborhoods. These cases represented one of the first instances 
in which the courts embraced the idea that the nuisance doctrine 
protected a landowner from mental disturbances as well as physical 
discomfort.177 Moreover, these cases exemplify some of the earliest 
nuisance cases arising without any physical invasion of the plaintiff's 
land. 
Initially, the courts were reluctant to enjoin these establishments 
based merely on the presence of a mental disturbance. To find a 
private nuisance, the courts would strain reason to characterize the 
establishment as creating a physical disturbance. For example, in 
Tureman v. Ketterlin,178 the Missouri Supreme Court held that a 
funeral home constituted a private nuisance because it created a 
constant reminder of death that had a weakening effect on a person's 
physical resistance to disease.179 
Later cases relinquished the fiction that a funeral home makes 
people more susceptible to disease. For example, after enjoining the 
establishment of a funeral home, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in 
Powell v. Taylor,180 commented that its decision did not rest on a 
finding that the funeral home was physically offensive.181 Rather, the 
court's decision rested on the premise that the funeral home pre-
sented a "continuous suggestion of death and dead bodies [that 
tended] to destroy the comfort and repose sought in home owner-
ship."I82 In addition to the question of mental annoyance, another 
controlling issue in Powell was whether the neighborhood at issue 
was residential in characterYl:l Where, as in Powell, the neighborhood 
was found to be residential in character, injunctive relief was 
granted.l84 
Similar to the reasoning in the funeral home cases, the Alabama 
Supreme Court, in Tedescki v. Berger/85 enjoined the operation of a 
house of prostitution in a residential neighborhood.186 According to the 
court, the prostitution house was a private nuisance because it dis-
rupted the comfortable enjoyment of neighboring property and 
177 See Powell, 263 S.W.2d at 906--07; Streett, 291 S.w. at 497-98. 
178 263 S.w. at 202. 
179 [d. at 203. See also Saier, 164 N.W. at 507--08. 
180 263 S.W.2d at 906. 
181 [d. at 906-07. 
182 [d. at 907. Streett, 291 S.w. at 497-99. 
183 Powell, 263 S.W.2d at 907. 
184 [d. See also Howard v. Etchieson, 310 S.W.2d 473, 474-75 (Ark. 1958); Rockenbach v. 
Apostle, 47 N.W.2d 636, 638--39 (Mich. 1951). 
185 43 So. 960 (Ala. 1907). 
186 [d. at 961. See also Crawford v. Tyrrell, 28 N.E. 514, 515 (N.Y. 1891); KEETON ETAL., supra 
note 5, § 87, at 620. 
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caused a depreciation in neighboring property values.187 The court also 
noted that the nuisance doctrine should not only protect landowners 
from physical discomfort but from certain moral effronteries as well.188 
The funeral home and prostitution house cases demonstrate that a 
nuisance claim can be based on a mental disturbance without any 
physical invasion of the plaintiff's land.189 Most courts that have ad-
dressed the issue more recently, however, have not followed the rea-
soning in the funeral home and prostitution house casesYJO Moreover, 
although the funeral home and prostitution house cases have not been 
overturned,191 there is authority indicating that these cases may have 
limited precedential value. 
Commentators have indicated that the funeral home and prostitu-
tion house cases are best viewed as an example of town planning prior 
to the emergence of zoning laws, rather than psychological nuisance 
cases.19Z Supporting this contention is the reasoning in cases like Pow-
ell,loo which placed greater emphasis on the character of the neighbor-
hood at issue rather than the disturbance created.194 Not surprisingly, 
as the use of zoning laws began to increase in this country the number 
of cases like the funeral home and prostitution house cases declined 
precipitously. 195 
Another factor that may undermine the precedential significance of 
the funeral home and prostitution house cases is that these cases were 
all based on intentional conductY*' Therefore, the funeral home and 
prostitution house cases can be distinguished from cases, such as 
Adkins, that involve unintentional or negligent conduct.197 Unlike an 
intentional nuisance, the courts may be unwilling to recognize a nui-
sance claim arising out of negligent or unintentional conduct that is 
187 Tedescki, 43 So. at 961. 
188 Id. 
189 See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text. 
190 See infra notes 200-15 and accompanying text. 
191 See, e.g., Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 741 (Mich. 1992) (Levin, J., 
dissenting) (citing with approval Rockenbach v. Apostle, 47 N.W.2d 636 (Mich. 1951) and Dillon 
v. Moran, 211 N.W. 67 (Mich. 1926)). 
192 See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines 
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 721-22 (1973); Doane, supra note 123, at 450; 
Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, U. P A. L. REV. 1403, 
1438 (1983). 
100 Powell, 263 S.W.2d 906 (Ark. 1954). 
194 Id. at 907. 
195 See Ellickson, supra note 192, at 722 n.157. 
196 See, e.g., Howard v. Etchieson, 310 S.W.2d 473, 473-74 (Ark. 1958); KEETON ET AL., supra 
note 5, § 87, at 624-25. 
197 Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 738-39 (Mich. 1992) (Levin, J., dissenting). 
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based solely on a mental disturbance. 198 The rationale behind this rule 
is the need to prevent fraudulent or exaggerated claims.l99 
B. The Trend Away From the Funeral Home and Prostitution 
House Cases 
Recently, most courts have been reluctant to recognize a nuisance 
claim based solely on a mental disturbance without any physical inva-
sion of land. An early example of this was McCaw v. Harrison,2oo 
where the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's deci-
sion refusing to enjoin the defendants from using their property for 
the location of a commercial cemetery.201 According to the McCaw 
court, "a cemetery does not constitute a nuisance merely because it 
is a constant reminder of death and has a depressing influence on the 
minds of persons who observe it."202 The McCaw court further rea-
soned that a cemetery would be a nuisance only if, unlike the cemetery 
at issue, it endangered the public health by contaminating the area's 
drinking water.203 Thus, the court refused to recognize a nuisance 
claim based on mental anguish without a physical invasion of the 
plaintiff's land. 
As the law developed, the reasoning in McCaw emerged as the 
prevailing view, and the courts showed an increasing reluctance to 
recognize nuisance claims based solely on a psychological distur-
bance.204 For example, in Akins v. Sacramento Municipal Utility 
District,205 the California Court of Appeals refused to recognize a 
nuisance claim based upon the alleged anxiety and emotional distress 
stemming from the operation of a nuclear power plant.2OO The plaintiffs 
in Akins v. Sacramento were homeowners who brought, among other 
198 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 87, at 623-24, § 91, at 653. 
199 See, e.g., Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 145-46 (Ky. 1980). 
200 259 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953). 
201Id. at 459. 
202 I d. at 458. 
203Id. 
204 See, e.g., Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 780 F. Supp. 1097, 1104 (S.D. Miss. 1991) 
(dismissing property damage claim based on property depreciation caused by beliefs of resi-
dents' and potential buyers' that dangerous chemicals in area were causing health problems, 
absent confirmed physical property damage or confirmed threat of physical property damage); 
Gray v. Southern Facilities, Inc., 183 S.E.2d 438, 443 (S.C. 1971) (refusing to recognize damages 
claim based upon property depreciation resulting, not from any physical injury, but from a 
psychological factor, in that prospective buyers allegedly would be reluctant to purchase the 
property due to the fear of another fire occurring near plaintiff's property in the future). 
205 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
206Id. at 811. 
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claims, a private nuisance action against a neighboring nuclear power 
station.207 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant caused legally 
excessive levels of radiation to be released in their neighborhood.208 
It was conceded, however, that the plaintiffs had not suffered any 
present physical injury as a result of the radiation.209 Rather, the 
plaintiffs sought damages for emotional distress resulting from the 
defendant's creation of a nuisance.21o 
Despite these allegations, the Akins v. Sacramento court concluded 
that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the power plant "re-
leased legally excessive levels of radioactive materials."211 Accord-
ingly, the court found that the plaintiffs were not exposed to "harmful 
and legally cognizable levels of radiation on their properties."212 In 
making its decision, the court reasoned that a nuisance claim cannot 
be based upon the "mere existence of a facility or activity which is 
statutorily authorized or upon anxiety caused by the mere knowledge 
of its presence."213 Additionally, the court commented that "fear, anxi-
ety, and emotional distress which are not caused by an interference 
with a specific private property right ... will not support a private 
action for nuisance."214 Accordingly, the plaintiffs' claim was dis-
missed.215 
To summarize, it appears that the reasoning in McCaw, that a 
nuisance claim cannot be based solely on mental anguish, has emerged 
as the prevailing view. Despite this trend, the funeral home and 
prostitution house cases, which recognize nuisance claims based solely 
on mental anguish, have not been overturned.216 Accordingly, it is 
conceivable that a court today might be willing to recognize such a 
claim. 
C. Recovery of Damages for Mental Anguish 
As the previous discussion demonstrated, there is a controversy 
regarding whether or not a nuisance claim can be based solely on 
2(1/ [d. at 788-89. 
200 [d. 
209 [d. at 805. 
210 [d. at 810. 





216 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
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mental anguish. Independent of this controversy is the widely ac-
cepted belief that mental anguish is recoverable as an element of 
damages where it accompanies an independent basis of tort liability.217 
Accordingly, in the private nuisance context, a plaintiff can recover 
damages for mental anguish that accompanies an otherwise actionable 
interference with the use and enjoyment of land. For example, in 
Macca v. General Telephone Co. of Northwest, Inc.,218 the Supreme 
Court of Oregon allowed a homeowner to recover damages for emo-
tional distress after first characterizing repeated telephone calls to 
the plaintiff's home as a private nuisance.219 The unwanted telephone 
calls resulted from the defendant telephone company's negligence in 
placing the plaintiff's telephone number in an advertisement for an 
after hours floral shop.220 
Similarly, in Edwards v. Talent Irrigation District,221 the Supreme 
Court of Oregon allowed the plaintiff to recover damages for mental 
anguish that accompanied an actionable nuisance.222 The defendant's 
irrigation ditch caused water to flow onto plaintiff's property destroy-
ing his sewage system and killing his fruit tree and garden.223 Finally, 
in Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft CO.,224 the District Court for the District 
of Kansas, applying Kansas law, allowed plaintiffs to recover damages 
for emotional distress where the defendant contaminated plaintiffs' 
ground water with a carcinogenic solvent.225 
Unlike the funeral home or prostitution house cases, in which the 
mental disturbance was the sole basis of tort liability,226 in each of the 
preceding cases there was an independent basis of tort liability-Le., 
the unwanted phone ringing in Macca;227 the destruction of the fruit 
tree and garden in Edwards;228 and the contamination of ground water 
in Bolin.229 
217 See, e.g., Edwards v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 570 P.2d 1169, 1169-70 (Or. 1977); Macca v. 
General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, 495 P.2d 1193, 1195-96 (Or. 1972). 
218 495 P.2d at 1193. 
219Id. at 1195. 
22°Id. at 1193. 
221 570 P.2d 1169 (Or. 1977). 
222Id. at 1169-70. 
223Id. at 1169. 
224 759 F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991). 
225 I d. at 697, 720. 
226 See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
227 Macca v. General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, 495 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Or. 1972). 
228 Edwards v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 570 P.2d 1169, 1169 (Or. 1977). 
229 See Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 697 (D. Kan. 1991). 
580 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:557 
V. THE ADKINS DECISION 
The plaintiffs in Adkins v. Thomas Solvent CO.230 alleged that the 
defendant chemical company, by mishandling toxic chemicals in their 
neighborhood, created a private nuisance by causing a stigma of con-
tamination to attach to their land.231 Despite the fact that none of the 
contamination had or ever would physically invade their land, the 
plaintiffs alleged that their property values had depreciated because 
of the unfounded public perception that their land was polluted.232 
Curiously, the plaintiffs' claim did not arise out of their own personal 
discomfort or annoyance.233 Rather, it arose out of the unfounded fears 
of third party purchasers.234 
In refusing to recognize the plaintiffs' claim, the Adkins court held 
that a private nuisance cannot be based on property depreciation 
caused by unfounded fears of third party purchasers.235 According to 
the court, "the fact ... that plaintiffs made no claim for relief arising 
out of their own fears illustrate[d] the point that defendants' activities 
did not interfere with their use and enjoyment of property."236 Be-
cause the plaintiffs were not alleging that they themselves were 
disturbed or annoyed by the contamination, their claim was based 
entirely on allegations of property depreciation. Therefore, by refus-
ing to recognize the plaintiffs' claim, the Adkins decision reaffirmed 
the widely held belief that property depreciation without other harm 
is damnum absque injuria.237 
In support of its decision, the Adkins court reasoned that to award 
damages for property depreciation resulting from the unfounded 
fears of third party purchasers would ultimately divert funds away 
from the actual cleanup.238 The court noted that polluters have limited 
resources and reasoned that it would not make sense to benefit those 
who have not suffered a cognizable injury at the expense of those who 
have.239 
230 487 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1992). 
231 [d. at 721. 
232 [d. at 718, 721. 
233 See id. at 724, 726-27. 
234 [d. at 724. 
235 [d. at 724-25. 
236 [d. at 724. 
237 [d. at 723-25. 
238 [d. at 727. 
239 [d. 
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Additionally, the Adkins court justified its decision on the basis 
that recognizing the plaintiffs' claim would create a dangerous prece-
dent.240 According to the court it would: 
not only be odd but anachronistic that a claim of nuisance ... could 
be based on unfounded fears regarding persons with AIDS mov-
ing into a neighborhood, the establishment of otherwise lawful 
group homes for the disabled, or unrelated persons living to-
gether, merely because the fears experienced by third parties 
would cause a decline in property values.241 
At first glance, the Adkins decision appears to hold that one cannot 
recover for property depreciation due to the presence of hazardous 
substances without proof of existing contamination.242 The court 
stated explicitly, however, that a private nuisance does not require a 
physical invasion of land.243 The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim 
not because of the absence of a physical invasion of land, but rather 
because the plaintiffs' claim was based solely on a depreciation in 
property value.244 The court indicated that the case may have come 
out differently had the plaintiffs alleged that the "character of the 
neighborhood [had] changed for the worse" or that an "unusual num-
ber of abandoned, neglected, and otherwise depressed properties in 
the neighborhood interfered with their use and enjoyment of land."245 
Therefore, the Adkins decision arguably stands for the principle 
that a plaintiff can prevail in private nuisance without alleging any 
physical invasion of land so long as the plaintiff complains of more 
than a mere depreciation in property value. 
VI. BEYOND ADKINS 
The Adkins court indicated that the plaintiffs may have prevailed 
had their claim arisen out of their own fears or discomfort, as opposed 
to the fears of third party purchasers.246 Moreover, the court explained 
that a private nuisance does not require a physical invasion of land.247 
Looking beyond the Adkins decision, the question remains as to 
240 I d. at 726. 
241Id. 
242 See Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 147 F.R.D. 237, 245 (D. Colo. 1993), aff'd on other grounds, 
151 F.R.D. 378 (D. Colo. 1993). 
243 Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Mich. 1992). 
244 I d. at 725. 
245 I d. at 727. 
246 See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text. 
247 See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text. 
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whether there is a legal theory that would allow similarly situated 
plaintiffs to recover. For example, could plaintiffs recover under an 
anticipatory nuisance theory in which the plaintiffs allege that they 
themselves are frightened by the threat of future contamination? 
Alternatively, could plaintiffs assert, as in Exxon Corp. v. Yarema,248 
that the contamination in their neighborhood has created a physical 
inconvenience to the use and enjoyment of their land? Finally, could 
plaintiffs use the funeral home and prostitution house cases to set 
forth a nuisance claim based on the mental anguish caused by living 
amidst area-wide contamination?249 
A. Anticipatory Nuisance in the Adkins Situation 
An anticipatory nuisance theory will probably not afford recovery 
for plaintiffs in a situation similar to Adkins. Because the plaintiffs 
are assured that none of the contamination has or ever will physically 
invade their property, the plaintiffs' fear of future contamination is 
unfounded.250 Despite early hospital and sanitarium cases such as 
Everett v. Paschall,251 the courts have moved away from recognizing 
nuisance claims based on fear of future injury that is not grounded in 
objectively verifiable or reliable scientific information.252 Thus, as in 
O'Laughlin v. City of Fort Gibson,253 plaintiffs in a situation similar to 
Adkins, will be probably unable to recover in private nuisance based 
on unfounded fears of future injury.254 
B. Nuisance Based on the Physical Inconvenience of Living 
Amidst Area-Wide Contamination 
Although plaintiffs in an Adkins situation probably cannot prevail 
under an anticipatory nuisance theory, Yarema255 demonstrates that 
plaintiffs can prevail in private nuisance despite the absence of any 
existing or threatened physical invasion of land.256 Under this theory, 
the plaintiffs should allege, as in Yarema,257 that the contamination in 
248 516 A.2d 990, 1004--05 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). See also supra notes 158-69 and accom-
panying text. 
249 See supra notes 171-99 and accompanying text. 
250 See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
251 111 P. 879 (Wash. 1910). See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra notes 135--40 and accompanying text. 
253 389 P.2d 506 (Okla. 1964). 
254 [d. at 509. See also supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text. 
255 516 A.2d 990 (Md. Spec. Ct. App. 1986). 
256 See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
257 See 516 A.2d at 1005. 
1994] PRIVATE NUISANCE 583 
their neighborhood has imposed physical inconveniences upon them 
that have disturbed the use and enjoyment of their property. Conced-
edly, the facts in the Adkins situation258 may not be as strong as those 
in Yarema, where the city forbade the plaintiffs from using their 
ground water, building houses on their land, or selling their property 
even at a reduced price.259 Even in the absence of such formal restric-
tions, however, it is conceivable that plaintiffs in a situation similar to 
Adkins may be able to allege certain physical inconveniences caused 
by the contamination. For example, access to the plaintiffs' property 
may become more difficult due to the clean-up effort in their neigh-
borhood. Perhaps the plaintiffs can argue that they can no longer 
build on their property because of their inability to obtain financing. 
Finally, the inconvenience might be as simple as the plaintiffs' inabil-
ity to entertain because friends are reluctant to visit. 
C. Nuisance Based on the Mental Anguish Caused by Area-Wide 
Contamination 
As opposed to a physical inconvenience, it is conceivable that the 
plaintiffs in an Adkins situation may prevail on the theory that living 
amidst area-wide contamination has had a depressing psychological 
effect on them which has disturbed the comfortable use and enjoy-
ment of their property.260 As in the funeral home and prostitution 
house cases, the courts have recognized that the right to the use and 
enjoyment of land includes freedom from mental annoyance.261 Argu-
ably, the thought of living amidst area-wide contamination creates as 
much mental anguish in neighboring landowners as the depressing 
effect of living next to a funeral home or the moral effrontery created 
by a house of prostitution. 
Unlike an anticipatory nuisance, which is based on the fear of future 
harm, a nuisance based on a mental disturbance would not require the 
plaintiffs' anguish to be "well founded in science."262 Accordingly, the 
plaintiffs in an Adkins situation could prevail, regardless of the fact 
that none of the contamination has or ever will physically invade their 
property. Additionally, because this claim is based on a disturbance to 
258 See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
259 See 516 A.2d at 1004--D5. 
260 See supra notes 175--88 and accompanying text. 
261 See id. 
262 Everett v. Paschall, 111 P. 879, 881 (Wash 1910). See supra notes 135--40 and accompanying 
text. 
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the plaintiffs' peace of mind, it does not challenge the 600-year-old rule 
that property depreciation, in itself, is damnum absque injuria.263 
Concededly, there are a number of obstacles which must be over-
come before a court would be willing to recognize this claim. First, 
with the exception of the funeral home and prostitution house cases, 
there is little case law to support this proposition.264 Moreover, there 
is authority indicating that the funeral home and prostitution house 
cases have limited precedential significance.265 Certain commentators 
have indicated that these cases are probably best viewed as examples 
of town planning prior to the emergence of zoning laws rather than 
psychological nuisance cases.266 
Despite these obstacles, the funeral home and prostitution house 
cases have not been overturned.267 Indeed, these cases have been cited 
in recent decisions.268 Additionally, Keeton and Prosser cite the fu-
neral home and prostitution house cases for the proposition that the 
right to the use and enjoyment of land includes freedom from mental 
disturbance.269 
Additionally, a potential obstacle to relying on the funeral home and 
prostitution house cases is that they involve intentional conduct.27o 
Therefore, these cases can be distinguished from the Adkins situation 
which arose out of unintentional or negligent conduct.271 Because of 
the physical impact rule in negligence, courts may be particularly 
reluctant to recognize a nuisance claim based solely on a mental 
disturbance that arises out of negligent conduct.272 The rationale be-
hind the physical impact rule is the need to prevent fraudulent or 
exaggerated claims.273 
An exception to the physical impact rule in negligence, the so-called 
"bystander proximity doctrine," could arguably be applied in the pri-
vate nuisance context. The doctrine holds a defendant liable for a 
plaintiff's emotional trauma, without any physical impact to the plain-
tiff, where the emotional trauma was reasonably foreseeable to the 
defendant.274 
263 See Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 726 (Mich. 1992). 
2&1 See supra notes 175-88 and accompanying text. 
265 See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
267 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
268 See id. 
269 KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 87, at 620. 
270 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
271 See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
272 See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
274 See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text. 
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In a nuisance context, the bystander proximity doctrine could allow 
recovery for plaintiffs in an Adkins situation, where the plaintiff's 
mental anguish would be reasonably foreseeable to the defendant 
polluter. In assessing whether the plaintiff's mental anguish was rea-
sonably foreseeable to the defendant, courts may consider a number 
of factors similar to the reasoning adopted in Dillon v. Legg.275 For 
example, courts may consider whether the plaintiff's land was located 
near the scene of the accident as contrasted with land that was located 
a substantial distance away from it. Courts could require that the 
plaintiff's land borders contaminated land. As in the funeral home and 
prostitution house cases, courts may require that the damaged land 
be located in a strictly residential neighborhood, as opposed to an 
industrial neighborhood. Courts might also consider the size of the 
spill caused by the defendant or the toxicity of the substances in-
volved.276 
In addition to the physical impact rule, courts might be unwilling 
to recognize a nuisance claim based on mental anguish because of a 
reluctance to divert money away from the cleanup.277 The court in 
Adkins commented on the fact that it would be unproductive to allow 
a reordering of a polluter's resources for the benefit of persons who 
have suffered no cognizable harm at the expense of claimants who 
have been subjected to actual contamination.278 Arguably, while this 
type of claim might divert resources away from the cleanup, the 
object of the tort system is to compensate those who have been 
injured by tortious conduct. Similarly, if a number of plaintiffs have 
sustained a depreciation in property value, it is not clear why certain 
plaintiffs should be denied compensation because of the fortuity that 
none of the contamination has or will physically invade their property. 
Additionally, it can be argued that compensating plaintiffs for the 
mental disturbance caused by pollution serves as a deterrent to this 
type of conduct. 
Additionally, a court might invoke the "slippery slope" argument as 
a reason to deny recovery for this claim.279 As indicated in Adkins, 
courts are reluctant to recognize a cause of action that could also be 
used to frustrate socially desirable conduct, such as a hospice for 
275 See 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 19(8); supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
276 In addition to these restrictions, the threat of fraudulent claims will also be reduced by the 
substantial harm requirement. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. To prevail in 
private nuisance, the plaintiff must establish that the interference complained of would cause 
significant harm to a person of normal sensibilities in the community. Id. 
277 See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text. 
278 Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 727 (Mich. 1992). 
279 See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text. 
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AIDS patients or the establishment of a group home for the dis-
abled.280 Concededly, such establishments might create as great a 
mental disturbance to neighboring landowners as living amidst area-
wide contamination. 
Unlike such socially desirable establishments, however, which in-
volve intentional conduct, the Adkins situation involves unintentional 
or negligent conduct.281 Nuisance claims based on unintentional con-
duct can be distinguished from intentional nuisance claims because 
they do not involve the unreasonable use requirement. Accordingly, 
unintentional nuisance claims place far less emphasis on the balancing 
test-Df the harm created versus the utility of the conduct creating 
the harm-which lies at the heart of the unreasonable use require-
ment.282 Such a balancing test could prevent a nuisance action based 
on mental anguish from prevailing against a socially desirable estab-
lishment, such as a hospice for AIDS patients. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Homeowners, who find themselves in a situation similar to the 
plaintiffs in Adkins v. Thomas Solvent CO.,283 face an uphill battle. To 
prevail under a private nuisance theory, homeowners will have to 
establish that they have incurred an interference with the use and 
enjoyment of their land. Unfortunately, the courts widely hold that a 
depreciation in property value, without other harm, will not suffice. 
Additionally, case law demonstrates that homeowners in this situation 
will most likely fail under an anticipatory nuisance theory because 
their fear of future injury is unfounded. Accordingly, the strongest 
argument for these homeowners is to allege, as did the plaintiffs in 
Exxon Corp. v. Yarema,284 that the contamination in their neighbor-
hood has imposed certain physical inconveniences upon them. If the 
facts in a particular case do not permit such an argument, however, 
homeowners should allege that living amidst area-wide contamination 
has caused them subtantial mental anguish which has disturbed the 
comfortable use and enjoyment of their property. Although the courts 
have yet to be presented with such a claim, this theory is supported 
by the reasoning applied in the funeral home and prostitution house 
cases. 
200 See 487 N.W.2d at 726. 
281 See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
282 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
283 487 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1992). 
284 516 A.2d 990 (Md. Ct. App. 1986). 
